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Abstrat Reent studies foused on the importane of adopting network
analysis approahes suh as soial network analysis in the supply hain net-
works to better understand and manage the roles of organizations in inter-
organizational relationships. The main aim of this researh is to identify and
integrate network analysis metris in the existent literature in this realm
whih is appliable to haraterize the position and role of organizations
in the supply hain network ontext and their impat on the behavior and
outomes of organizations and the whole supply hain network.
To this aim, we followed a systemati literature review proess using Sopus
database to identify high-quality papers through several sreening stages.
Our ndings illustrate that there are two main soures of interrm dierenes
inluding atomisti properties and relational properties. With an emphasis
on relational properties through the lens of network analysis metris, we
integrated inuential harateristis on ator's behavior and performane
into three main ategories of node level, tie level, and network level.
Our ndings are appliable to address any emergent phenomenon and the
roles of ators based on their position in the network ontext suh as supply
hain network and study their behavior and performane.
Keywords: Supply hain network, inter-organizational relationships, net-
work analysis, soial network analysis, supply hain network metris.
1. Introdution
Early researh on supply hain networks (e.g., Esmaeili et al., 2009;

Zigi and
Mai, 2011; Hosseini-Motlagh et al., 2019) foused primarily on dyadi interations
between buyers and sellers in whih seller represents the terms supplier, vendor,
and manufaturer, and buyer represents the distributer, wholesaler, and retailer
(Esmaeili and Zeephongsekul, 2010). Also, they mostly have addressed tehnial
issues in engineering and operations management modeling approahes (Min and
Zhou, 2002). However, many studies (Borders et al., 2001; Choi and Wu, 2009;
Pilbeam et al., 2012) emphasize that dyadi models are inadequate in eetively
apture and desribe the omplex dynami interative nature inherent in the supply
hain network, and the behavior of ators whih are rational loally, will be globally
ineient (Whang, 1995). In this regard, network analysis approah as an emerging
interdisiplinary lens is appliable to overome this theoretial and methodologial
(Basole et al., 2011).
Network studies and in partiular supply hain network studies with dierent na-
ture of relationships among interating ators has beome inreasingly popular over
the years (Anderson et al., 1998). They emphasize on the importane of strategi
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allianes, global outsouring, partnership formation and ollaboration, et. (Akyuz
and Erkan, 2010). From a supply hain network perspetive, the relative position
of ators in relation with other ators inuene their both strategy, behavior, and
outomes (Borgatti and Li, 2009; Bellamy et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2011). In this
omplex network of relationships that the ators are embedded in, eonomi and
soial dimensions are ritial to onsider (Choi and Kim, 2008) and hene, it is
imperative to study the role and importane of ators derived from their embed-
ded positions in the inter-organizational relationships (Borgatti and Li, 2009; Kim
et al., 2011). In this regard, several studies (e.g., Borgatti and Li, 2009) proposed
to analyze the strutural harateristis of supply hain networks using the soial
network analysis as a formal and quantitative modeling approah (Kim et al., 2011).
In the supply hain network ontext total domination of one ator is not possible
over resoures and ativities of other ators (Heikkinen et al., 2007; Knight and
Harland, 2005). If supply network members understand their role, it is more likely
to oordinate and harmonize their ations with eah other with the objetive of
providing value for the entire network whih result in greater value aross ators
(Yim et al., 2013). It then beomes important to study dierent leader and follower
roles, status roles, operational roles (e.g., ustomer, supplier, produer, et.), and
so on as the roles of formal organizations (Zaidat et al., 2005). Consequently, there
is a window of opportunity to review and illustrate the signiane and appliation
of adopting network analysis approahes in the supply hain networks to better
understand and manage ators' roles. For example, Burkhardt and Brass (1990) and
Ibarra (1993) illustrated that the position of ators in the network aets their power
and inuene. Others have linked network position to suh issues as innovation
adoption (e.g., Ibarra, 1993), brokering (e.g., Pollok et al., 2004; Zaheer and Bell,
2005), higher innovation (e.g., Bellamy et al., 2014), higher performane (e.g., Sanou
et al., 2016), et.
Therefore, the fundamental objetives of this systemati literature review are to
identify and lassify network analysis studies in the supply hain network ontext,
organize them into an integrative framework, and suggest future researh diretions.
The remainder of the paper is strutured as follows. Setion 2 desribes net-
work analysis in the literature. Setions 3 presents supply hain networks, inter-
organizational relationships, and potential advantages. Setion 4 provides the main
body of literature review on supply hain network analysis metris and the details
of our integrative framework. In Setion 5, we present the importane of roles and
positions in the supply hain network ontext and the appliation of the onept
of entrality. Setion 6 provides onlusion and some diretion for future interdisi-
plinary researh opportunities.
2. Network Analysis in the Literature
2.1. Network
A network is a generalization of graph, omprising a set of verties (ators) and
a binary interation (tie or link) whih onnet these ators (Rapoport, 1979). The
repeated interations among ators will form a pattern of diret and indiret ties
whih is dened as network struture (Hoang and Antoni, 2003; Knoben et al.,
2006). There is a broad literature on network studies whih have been published
aross a wide variety of elds and in partiular among organizational and eonomi
sholars (Knoben et al., 2006). In this regard, theoretial ontributions formed a
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body of knowledge known as network theory, and is dened as the mehanisms and
proesses, through them a set of ators whih potentially are related together and
form the network struture yield ertain outomes for eah ator and the whole
network (Omta et al., 2002; Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). These theoretial and
empirial studies fous on three elements of network inluding (1) the nature of
the ontent that is exhanged between ators; (2) governane mehanisms; and (3)
the network struture.
Network ontent provides its members aess to resoures and apital through
network ties (Gulati et al., 2000). Ators in the network an benet many opportu-
nities for sharing various kinds of resoures suh as nanial (Keister, 1998), institu-
tional (Baum and Oliver, 1991), knowledge and information resoures (Uzzi, 1996;
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) et. Network provides the ators
the possibility of dierent types of interations (lient referrals, shared resoures,
shared information, et.) whih an be evaluated from the extent or strength of eah
relationship viewpoint (whether it ours through referrals only, through referrals
and resoures, through several types of interations, et. within the same link), or
what is termed multiplexity in network terminology.
Network governane. Any eonomi exhange among ators needs an agreement
upon the way of dividing osts, benets, and risks (Williamson, 1985) whih is
alled the governane mehanism (Williamson, 1996). There are three governane
mehanisms inluding (Powell et al., 1990; Meijer, 2009, p.69):
1) A market governane mehanism where buyers and sellers ontinually seek
the best hoie in their single-term transations and move to another trade partner
if it is more beneial for them. In suh a governane mehanism, all ators have
full and symmetri information whih is known as perfet market, and the optimal
prie will be determined by supply and demand urve in a ost and benet analysis.
In other words, there is no assoiated osts of business that do not add value to
the produt. These osts are dened as ex ante ost of ontrat or ex post ost
of opportunism, inluding osts of searhing, bargaining, monitoring and enforing
whih is alled transation osts (Williamson, 1985; Coase, 1937).
2) A hierarhy governane mehanism provides the ators with purhasing pro-
dution apaity of the other ators through a ontrat. In other words, the buyer
employs the seller through this mehanism.
3) A network governane mehanism inludes a selet, persistent, and strutured
set of autonomous ators engaged in network ativities based on impliit and open-
ended ontrats whih are supported by soial mehanisms like inuene (Thorelli,
1986; Krakhardt, 1990) to adapt to ontingent environment and to oordinate
and seure exhanges (Jones et al., 1997). It provides independent ators with the
possibility of ontrolling network proesses through long-term relationships. The
interonnetion of links through shared end points forms paths that indiretly on-
nets all ators together whih are not diretly tied. This path yields a partiular
network struture, and eah ator oupies a position within this struture. Eah
network has a boundary whih is dened by hoosing a set of ators and the type
of links, and this is determined by a researher (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). This
governane mehanism undergirds and oordinates network exhanges. One of the
ritial fators whih an enhane the quality of the resoure exhanges in the net-
work is trust among ators (Larson, 1992; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). Trust
redues transation osts for example monitoring and bargaining osts in reation
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to environmental hanges (Williamson, 1993; Wu et al., 2009). However, threat of
ostraism and loss of reputation (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Jones et al., 1997)
are also supportive riteria for this network exhanges rather than legal enforement.
Therefore, sholars reognize networks as a form of governane with its stru-
ture and operating logi (Miles and Snow, 1992) whih emphasize on soiality of
exhanges among ators and the transations whih are based on relationships, mu-
tual interests, and reputation (Moretti, 2017, p.11). These soial mehanisms in
network governane redue transation osts whih provides it with omparative
advantage over markets and hierarhies (Jones et al., 1997).
Williamson (1996) assumes that organizations use a mix of governane meha-
nisms with the lowest transation osts whih leads to better performane of the
whole network. Aording to this view, hierarhial governane strutures should
be favored when opportunism is likely and transation osts are high. Market ex-
hange should be preferred when ontrats are readily written and enfored and
transation osts are low. If we extend this for allianes, then allianes make sense
in more intermediate situations when transation osts are not so severe as to re-
quire hierarhial ontrol but are not so low as to enable market-based exhange.
When networks perform better, they are apable to provide higher value for the end
ustomer and higher prot for the ators in the network. For example, 1) ators in
the network ideally minimize searhing ost for a partner as they know well eah
other. However, the situation should not be in a way to reate the lok-in problem,
where ators are dependent on their partners, and they are unable to ontat a new
partner without substantial swithing ost for the produts and servies. Aord-
ingly, lok-in problem may result in either barriers for new market entrants with
high osts or antitrust ation with lower osts against a monopoly ondition where
there is only one supplier of a partiular produt or servie. 2) The frequeny of
bargaining for those partners whih have long-term interation and agreements will
be ideally minimized. 3) Monitoring osts in those long-term agreements will be ide-
ally minimized, where partners an trust mutually and have better knowledge about
eah other's business situation. 4) Enforement osts will be ideally minimized as
partners in the network trust eah other and they are aware of their onsequent
individual performane on the whole network. However, in many networks the sit-
uation will not be ideally like these, and they annot trust eah other where they
think the other partner is taking their advantages (Meijer, 2009, p.18).
Network struture. It is typially asserted by organizational soiologists that
network formation is driven by exogenous fators like resoures or the soial stru-
ture of resoure dependene (Pfeer and Salanik 1978; Burt 1983). Following this
view, reating ties among ators is based on satisfying the needs (ator reates
tie with another ator who us owner of resoures or ontrols them) and manag-
ing unertainties and onstraints (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Network struture
illustrates the position of ators and the pattern of ties among them. From the
one hand, the main idea is that this patter is unique, provides the opportunity
for sharing resoures, aet the behavior and performane of ators, and poten-
tially onfers ompetitive advantage (Gulati et al., 2000; Zaheer et al., 2010). For
example, Zaheer and Zaheer (1997) and MEvily and Zaheer (1999) illustrate in
their studies that how network struture and its harateristis aet the perfor-
mane and ompetitive apabilities. Similarly, Podolny (1993) demonstrate how ties
aet returns harateristis in banking industry and Baker and Faulkner (1991)
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who emphasize on the inuene of ties' pattern on performane and entrane of
organizations in the movie industry. However, there are also some studies who have
ontrary opinion about the positive inuene of struture on performane. On the
other hand, network may limit its members from aessing opportunities and in-
formation outside the network whih is known as lok-in eet (Ingram and Baum,
1997) or puts a onstraint on non-partiipant ators whih may benet members for
example by providing them knowledge for R&D ativities (Westney, 1993). Lok-in
and lok-out eets our beause in many situations, ties formed with one ator
plae onstraints on ties with others (Gulati et al., 2000). Consequently, network
struture and ties may negatively inuene rm performane (Gulati et al., 2002).
Therefore, the position of ators within the network struture aet their per-
formane onsidering their dierenes in aessing resoure ows. In this regard, a
variety of approahes and measures drawn from network theory have been developed
to analyze networks, positions in the networks, network struture, soial interation
among ators within the network struture, and all related problems. To study these
areas and to understand ations of ators in the ontext of strutured relationships,
network analysis is required to operationalizes strutures in terms of networks of
linkages among units.
2.2. Network Analysis
Network analysis is a set of integrated tehniques draws on theories from the so-
ial, organizational, and omplexity sienes and leverages graph theoreti methods
and network theory to haraterize, model, analyze, and visualize relations, stru-
tures, dynamis, and strategies whih is emerged from repeated interations among
ators in the network (Bellamy and Basole, 2013; Chiesi, 2001). As a basi assump-
tion, this analysis allows better explanations of soial phenomena. Implementing
mathematial language of graph theory and matries as well as relational algebra
enable it to operationalize ators and their relations within the onept of the soial
network and study the inuene of soial struture of relationships among network
ators (e.g., individuals, groups, and organizations) on their behavior and outomes
(Chiesi, 2001).
The methods of network analysis grounded in important soial phenomena and
provided lear formal statements and measures of soial strutural properties whih
reated the term soial network analysis in the literature (Wasserman and Faust,
1994). Network perspetives are based on the belief that the position of ators
within the soial network and the soial ontext in whih ators are embedded
aet the eonomi ations of ators (Gulati, 1998). In short, the soial network
analysis provides an appropriate approah to investigate the network struture and
the position of ators.
2.3. Soial Network Analysis
Soial network analysis in general onerns the behavior of ators (e.g., individ-
uals, groups, organizations, et.), the soial pattern of relationships among them as
network struture (e.g., material transations, ow of resoures or servies, behav-
ioral interations, et.) and orresponding features, and the interations between
the two within a network (Chang et al., 2012, Moliterno and Mahony, 2011). The
onept of a network emphasizes that eah ator has ties to a set of ators, and
the phrase of "soial network" refers to the set of ators and their ties (Wasser-
man and Faust, 1994). It relies on strutural explanations of network outomes and
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provides a set of analytial tool framework for testing theories onerning stru-
ture of relationships among ators. For this, it onsiders ties and ators as units of
analysis whih represent the network, and fouses on analyzing onguration of ties
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Moretti, 2017).
Soial network analysis involves theories, models, and appliations that are rep-
resented in terms of relational onepts or proesses whih indiates that tie is the
basi omponent of network theories. Clearly, it is neessary to onsider spei sorts
of ties for eah type of ators whih is relevant or measurable. So, the relation of
ators in a dyadi level is a property of the dyad and not inherently a harateristi
of individual ator (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). There are a lot of eorts to legit-
imize it as a theory by olleting and summarizing its main onepts, theories, and
limitations (e.g., Borgatti et al., 2009; Kildu and Brass, 2010). For example, this
approah provides an appropriate theoretial framework in investigation the fea-
tures of network struture and their impat on organizational performane (Powell
et al., 1999), rm innovation (Bellamy et al., 2014), individuals' opportunities (Uzzi,
1997), et.
There are several key onepts and terms at the heart of network analysis whih
are fundamental in disussing soial networks. Therefore, before further explana-
tions of our researh area we need to understand the orresponding terminology in
soial network analysis.
Terminology of soial network analysis. Studies on soial network analysis
area have been direted by a shared glossary of the main terms and onepts used
in the theories orresponding the ators, ties, and struture of network. Here, we
present a denition for a set of terms and onepts whih is used in this dotoral
researh (Table 1).
Table 1. Terminology of soial network analysis
Term/ Conept Desription
Ator Ators are disrete individual, olletive soial entity, organi-
zation, or nation-states in the world system. It is also known
as node in the network terminology (Wasserman and Faust,
1994; Kildu and Tsai, 2003; Moretti; 2017; Swierzek, 2018).
Ego The foal ator (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Alter The other ators whih are onneted to foal ator (Wasser-
man and Faust, 1994)
Position It to a set of ators whih are embedded in the network
struture with orresponding relations through network ties
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Kinnie et al., 2005).
Role It refers to expeted behaviors through patterns of relations
toward other ators or positions (Wasserman and Faust, 1994;
Kinnie et al., 2005).
Status A series of observable harateristis assoiated with a parti-
ular role (Kinnie et al., 2005).
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Relational tie Any type of linkages that onnet ators to one another by
soial ties whih an be behavioral interations, assoia-
tion or aliation, business transations, et. (Wasserman
and Faust, 1994; Kildu and Tsai, 2003).
Asymmetri tie A one-way tie or link between ators (Wasserman and
Faust, 1994).
Dyad The basi level of linkage or relationship between two a-
tors. The tie is a property of pairs and is not pertain to
individual ator (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Kildu and
Tsai, 2003).
Triad The level of linkages or relationships among a subset of
three ators with (possible) tie(s) among them (Wasser-
man and Faust, 1994; Kildu and Tsai, 2003).
Subgroup Any subset of ators with all (possible) tie(s) among them
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Kildu and Tsai, 2003).
Clique A subgroup of ators in whih all ators have diret ties
with eah other (fully interonneted ators) (Wasserman
and Faust, 1994; Kildu and Tsai, 2003).
Density The degree of interonnetedness of ators or the overall
onnetedness of a network. In other word, it is the num-
ber of total ties in a network relative to the number of
potential ties (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Kildu and
Tsai, 2003; Moretti; 2017; Swierzek, 2018).
Network plot A visual representation of all ators in the network and
the links (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Network size The number of ators in a network (Wasserman and Faust,
1994; Kildu and Tsai, 2003; Moretti; 2017).
Network intensity The sum of the average infrequeny of interation sore
for eah ator (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Kildu and
Tsai, 2003; Swierzek, 2018).
Multiplexity The number of dierent types of relation (more than
one) in the same link between two ators that aet the
strength of the relationship (Wasserman and Faust, 1994;
Kildu and Tsai, 2003; Moretti; 2017).
Network typology Classiation of networks aording to their strutural
and funtional features (Wasserman and Faust, 1994;
Moretti; 2017).
Network topology Arrangement and onguration of ators and their ties in
a network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Moretti; 2017).
Network entralization It aptures the extent to whih the overall onnetedness is
organized around partiular ators in a network (Wasser-
man and Faust, 1994; Kildu and Tsai, 2003; Moretti;
2017).
Network omplexity It refers to the number of dependeny relations within a
network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Kildu and Tsai,
2003; Moretti; 2017).
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Strutural hole A strutural hole refers to an empty spae between two
ators that an be spanned by a third ator who an be-
ome the only intermediary between them (Wasserman
and Faust, 1994; Kildu and Tsai, 2003; Moretti; 2017).
Network ohesion The two ators are ties by a strong network onnetion
either diretly or indiretly through mutual third-party
ties (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Kildu and Tsai, 2003;
Moretti; 2017).
Centrality It refers to the extent to whih an ator oupies a posi-
tion in the network whih is relatively known as the most
important, prominent, and strategi position. The impor-
tane, prominene, and strategi terms are pereived dif-
ferently in the literature whih led to various measures of
entrality (Borgatti and Everett, 2006; Kiss and Bihler,
2008; Vurro et al., 2009; Zaheer et al., 2010; Kim et al.,
2011; Sanou et al., 2016).
Power Ability of an ator to use their resoures, apabilities, and
ompetenies (Barney, 1991; Teee et al., 1997; Prahalad
and Hamel, 1990; Smith, 2008), and embed them within
the inuene, ontrol, and motivation strategies whih
they use to ahieve and maintain signiant market pen-
etration and ommuniate their desires to eah other in
the network (Dahl, 1957, p.202; Emerson, 1962; El-Ansary
and Stem, 1972; Etgar, 1976).
Bridging A tie that links an ator with another ator that is not
onneted with its partners. In other words, a tie property
that measures the extent to whih a tie forms a bridge to
span the strutural hole (Cornwell, 2009; Gulati et al.,
2002).
Brokerage An ator property whih refers to the ontrol over bridging
(Everetta and Valente, 2016).
Cohesive tie A tie that links an ator with another ator whih is also
onneted with at least one of its partners (Tortoriello et
al., 2012; Gulati et al., 2002).
Closure It refers to the opposite of strutural holes, and is often
measured as ego-network density. A network with om-
plete losure is one in whih all ators are tied to eah
other, and in suh ases, density reahes its theoretial
maximum of one (Coleman, 1990, p. 310; Zaheer et al.,
2010).
2.4. Core Ideas in the Network Theory
Following the study of Wasserman and Faust (1994) as one of the basi soures
for many researhers who investigate researh questions in the ontext of network
using network theory framework, we need to attention that the attributes of ators
(e.g., size, age, produtivity, et.) in the network are seondary and relational ties
are primary. In other words, attributes of ators are understood in terms of network
struture and orresponding patterns of ties among ators. Hene, researhers an
also diretly study these patterns without referring to attributes of ators in im-
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plementing a network viewpoint. Aordingly, there are four ore ideas that drives
studies, inorporating network perspetive. These ore ideas are not ompletely dis-
tint onepts but profoundly interrelated (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Balkundi
and Kildu, 2006; Kildu and Brass, 2010; Moretti, 2017):
Relations among ators. The most important distinguishing feature of network
researh is emphasizing on relations among ators rather than an exlusively fous
on the attributes of ators. It is based on the fat that the behavior of agents
is inuened not only by their individual attributes but also by their relations in
the network. For example, Kraatz (1998) investigated the relations among private
olleges in the United States.
Embeddedness. This idea emphasizes that eonomi transations take plae within
a network of soial relationships. Embeddedness means that ators tend to transat
with network members (Granovetter, 1985). In other words, it highlights the pref-
erene for interating with those ators within the ommunity rather than those
outside the ommunity. It provides an interpretation onerning the governane of
eonomi ations in terms of trust and ohesion, and an be seen as an organizing
logi dierent than hierarhy and market relations (Powell, 1990).
Soial patterning means the existene of a soial struture haraterized at the
same time by the presene and absene of ties between agents, the understanding
of whih an help to explain eonomi outomes. By addressing patterns of net-
work struture, it is possible to study simultaneously ator, group, and network
harateristis.
Utility of network onnetions. It is based on the fat that soial network
onnetions represent onstraints and opportunities for ators, and thus the network
of relationships matters in reahing partiular outomes.
3. Supply Chain Network
Chopra and Meindl (2016, p.1) in their book entitled Supply Chain Manage-
ment: Strategy, Planning, and Operation indiate that a supply hain is dened
as all involved parties in fullling a ustomer request, diretly or indiretly. It
is typially omprising a variety of stages, inluding ustomers, retailers, whole-
salers/distributors, manufaturers, and omponent/raw material suppliers with or-
responding ators in eah stage. Eah stage in a supply hain is onneted through
the ow of produts, information, and funds. These ows often our in both di-
retions and may be managed by one of the stages or an intermediary (Figure 1).
The emergene of supply hain in the 1980s was with expanding prodution and
distribution optimization aross the borders of the rm (Simhi-Levi et al., 2000).
In other words, improvements moved from inside the ompany to the whole sup-
ply hain from raw materials to the nal ustomer. Following suh a movement,
Lazzarini et al. (2001) desribed two perspetives of supply hain and network to
analyze supply aross the borders of a rm. In the supply hain perspetive, a set
of sequential transations are organized vertially to reate value in several sues-
sive stages. These vertial interdependenies onsist of a forward ow of produts,
a bakward ow of money, and a bakward and forward ow of information be-
tween organizations engaged in sequential stages of prodution (Christopher, 1998;
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Fig. 1. Supply hain stages (Chopra and Meindl, 2016, p.3)
Simhi-Levi et al., 2000). However, in the network perspetive, the fous is on the
horizontal and vertial struture of inter-organizational relationships or ties that
while it an be onning, at the same time it is shaped by the ations of ators (Gra-
novetter, 1973; Burt, 1992). So, whereas supply hain more onentrates on vertial
ows and transations, the network perspetive adds a fous on ooperative eorts
and transations between ators in horizontal level (Meijer, 2009). In this regard,
Christopher (1992) point out that whilst supply hain is a demand driven hain by
the market and not by suppliers, the word hain should be replaed by network
sine several ators in eah level of supply hain are inluded.
Therefore, following Christopher (1992) and Nagurney and Li (2016), supply
hain network will be dened as a network of onneted and interdependent or-
ganizations, working through upstream and downstream ommuniations in the
dierent proesses and eonomi ativities. They partiipate in the proesses of the
prodution, delivery, and sales of values in the form of produts and servies for
ultimate onsumer, and ontrol, manage, and improve the ow of materials, money,
and information between stages.
The ontrats among ators in a supply hain network involve a set of trans-
ations and orresponding osts, inluding searhing, bargaining, monitoring and
enforing osts (Williamson, 1985; Coase, 1937). These four soures of transation
osts an be disussed from dierent governane mehanisms' perspetives (Table
2) whih aet the transation among ators, and ompanies usually prefer a mix
of these mehanisms to minimize these osts (Williamson, 1996).
3.1. Nature of Relations in Inter-Organizational Networks
Any analysis of inter-organizational networks puts emphasis on three aspets of
ators (organizations), ties and relations (the links that failitate transitivity, rei-
proity, diretionality, and multiplexity of ontent), and the overall network on-
guration, or network struture. The inter-organizational relationships have been
studied in several studies through dierent viewpoints and ategories. In this re-
searh we onsider a spetrum of relational forms (Figure 2.2) in whih ompetition
and ollaboration are in two opposite ends, depending on degree interdependeny
among ators in ahieving outomes and the goal of relationships (Gulati et al.,
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Table 2. Transation osts in three governane mehanisms (Meijer, 2009)
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2000; Rudzki and Trent, 2010, p.121). Despite sholars in this realm have an in-
tuitive notion of what ollaboration is, this onept usually is onfused with the
onept of ooperation as there are a lot of dierent appliations of them and re-
lated onepts suh as ommuniation and oordination (Camiranha-Matos and
Afsarmanesh, 2008). While ollaboration and ooperation are both onsidered as
win-win relational strategies, they are distinguishable in their nature. To better
understanding, we provide a denition and related explanations for them:
Competition or adversarial relationship is an ators' orientation to ahieve a posi-
tion with higher performane and to gain a ompetitive advantage over other ators
through either manipulating the strutural parameters of an industry to its advan-
tage or developing inimitable distintive ompetenies (Lado et al., 1997). It an
be onsidered as a zero-sum game orientation in whih ators ompete to aquire
resoures for eetive market position with superior nanial performane, and as
onsequene one ator wins and other ators lose. In other words, holding a om-
petitive advantage over ompetitors means to be more protable than ompetitors
over the long term and eonomi rents arue to ators that an aquire and utilize
sare resoures more eiently than other rms (Snow, 2017; Lado et al., 1997).
Cooperation relationship is a proess to share omplementary ompetenies, apa-
bilities, and resoures, or leveraging them for ahieving ompatible goals of ators
whih is not possible to be aomplished alone (Gnyawali et al., 2006). In other
words, it is ahieved by division of labor among partiipants through reiproities,
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formal or informal arrangements to share information and exhange resoures (not
neessarily symmetrial), support managerial and tehnial training, supply api-
tal, and/or provide market information (Polenske, 2004; Thomson and Perry, 2006;
Camiranha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2008). There is a transition from ooperation
to ollaboration when ators pursue a mutual goal (Thomson and Perry, 2006).
Coordination. There are too many dierent denitions with little agreements
in this regard. Aordingly, drives from several studies (Cheng, 1983; Malone and
Crowston, 1994; Alexander, 1995:14; Camiranha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2008),
we an dene oordination relationship as an ators' orientation to ahieve more
eient results by reognizing and managing the interdependenies between ators
and joint eorts harmoniously toward a set goal through systemati framework of
rules in whih mutual adjustment and aligned ativities of ators are logially on-
sistent and oherent. It an be viewed as jointly deision making, mutual adjustment
between relational and self-interested ators so that unertainties an be redued
and transation ost will be minimized.
Collaboration has a lot of dierent denitions suh as oordination with some
ommonalities and dierenes (Tomson and Perry, 2006). Hene, driving from these
studies (e.g., Wood and Gray, 1991; Camiranha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2008) with
fous on Tomson and Perry (2006) we dene ollaboration as a proess that ators
whih need for resoures and risk sharing due to resoure sarity are engaged in a
high degree and long-lasted exhange derived from high degree of interdependene,
and aggregating individual preferenes into olletive deisions derived from nego-
tiation among ompeting interests, expetations, and self-interested motivations.
Therefore, autonomous ators in order to share risks, resoures, responsibilities,
and rewards interat through formal and informal negotiations to reate joint rules
and strutures whih govern their relationships toward olletive deisions for the
mutually beneial interations. This denition involves reasoning of a high level of
aggregated ations omparing with ooperation or oordination, also ooperation
and ollaboration are at the two ends of spetrum in terms of interation, inte-
gration, ommitment, and omplexity (Tomson and Perry, 2006) (Figure 2). Also,
in omparing ompetition with ollaboration, there is a lear and sharp boundary
among organizations in pure ompetition rather than ollaboration whih is rooted
in tendeny of ators to taking full ontrol over ativities through the internal ex-
ploitation of ompetenies, apabilities, and resoures and to be the rst and sole
beneiary ator by apturing higher market segment (Oliver, 2004).
Fig. 2. Continuum of inter-organizational relationships
One of the main theoretial foundations in the domain of supply hain and
network where the organization is the unit of analysis is found mostly in the network
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theory. This approah fouses on the dynamis of the relationship between a set
of soial-eonomi ators in a soial-business network environment, and the basi
assumption of this network is that one ator is dependent on the other ator in
terms of under-ontrol resoures (Powell, 1990).
In the supply hains, the proesses and the interation of parties all together
aet the behavior, funtion, harateristis, and performane of ators and the
supply hain as a whole (Cloutier et al., 2010). In this regard, a omprehensive
understanding of the behavior and performane of ators and supply hains requires
a well study of soial and tehnial issues (Bellamy and Basole, 2013). Sine the
strutures among ators may be behavioral, soial, politial, or eonomi, soial
network analysis thus is appliable to allow a exible set of onepts and methods
with a wide range of interdisiplinary appeal (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Soial network analysis an be used to study network theoreti onstruts with
equal eay at various levels of analysis (Moliterno and Mahony, 2011) suh as
individual level (Obstfeld, 2000) and interrm ollaboration network level (Ahuja,
2000). Methodologial advantages of soial network analysis in the elds of logistis
and supply hain management within supply hain and supply network ontexts
has been aknowledged by several researhers (Choi et al., 2001; Ellram et al., 2006;
Carter et al., 2007; Kethen and Hult, 2007; Kim et al., 2011). For example, soial
network analysis approah has been onsidered as an instrument in exploring be-
havioral mehanisms of supply networks (Borgatti and Li, 2009) and understanding
the operations of supply networks (Kim et al., 2011) both at the whole network and
individual rm levels. It also is important in study of ritial positions within the
supply network and the inuene of supply network struture on the behavior and
performane individual ators and the whole network.
To this aim, we need to implement the soial network analysis as an interdisi-
plinary approah for investigating soial, organizational, and omplexity strutures
among a set of ator and ties that onnet them. It provides the possibility of visu-
alizing the struture, dynamis, and strategies and analyzing the relations among
ators, their behaviors, and outomes (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Chiesi, 2001;
Bellamy and Basole, 2013). In this regard, soial network sholars (e.g., Everett
and Borgatti, 1999; Freeman, 1977, 1979; Krakhardt, 1990; Marsden, 2002) have
developed a range of network metris to haraterize the dynamis inside a soial
network suh as supply hain network whih are neessary to investigate the soial
roles, positions, relations, and their impat on individual outomes and the network
as a whole. Therefore, a well understanding the literature of network analysis and
soial network analysis in the supply hain and supply hain network ontexts is
required for two purposes 1) study of behavior and performane of ators and the
supply hain network as a whole 2) study of any emerging phenomenon in these
ontexts in relation with the behavior and performane variables.
3.2. Potential Advantages and Outomes of Inter-Organizational
Networks
An extensive body of network studies have foused on highlighting the benets
that ators drive from network (Moretti, 2017; Gulati et al., 2011). In fat, dierent
properties related to various elements of network inluding network position, ties,
and struture are able to provide network members and the whole network some
advantages (Moretti, 2017; Gulati et al., 2011). Aording to the soial apital the-
ory, networks provide resoure aessibility for network positions embedded in the
186 Sajad Kazemi
network struture (Gulati et al. 2011). There are several theoretial ontributions
based on the network analysis whih study resoures and information whih a-
tors may benet in their networks suh as the strength of the ties (Granovetter,
1983) and strutural hole (Burt, 1992). This resoure aessibility provided by net-
work relationships has been studied by several sholars and interpreted into various
advantages and outomes. Investigating and olleting a omplete list of these ad-
vantages and outomes are beyond the sope of this researh, hene for the main
aim of this setion we just fous on the most ited advantages and outomes related
to the sope of this dotoral researh in the supply hain network ontext.
Performane To generate higher performane, organizations must establish an
environment in whih they have aess to shared resoure pool, share losses and
risks with other ators, and deide jointly with other partners in the network (Um
and Kim, 2019). One of the underlying theoretial foundation that an be used
to explain the onnetion of organizational performane and network is the trans-
ation ost eonomis (Williamson, 1985), fousing on the nanial benets and
ost redution opportunities driving from ollaborative relationships, ators' a-
essibility to resoure and apabilities beyond their organizational boundaries in
inter-organizational networks (Cao and Zhang, 2011). Higher eienies in sour-
ing, planning, produing, and distributing align with sharing losses and gains will
enable ators to show better performane in ollaborative networks (Um and Kim,
2019). In this regard, the Relational view (RV) theory also suggests that ators
generate higher performane in networks through an exhange relationship whih
annot be made in isolation (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
Network ativities of organizations suh as information gathering, supplier se-
letion, bargaining, and oordinating with suppliers require a ost that an be
avoided in ase of embeddedness of organizations in the inter-organizational re-
lationships haraterized by trust, repeated exhange, onsolidated oordination
mehanisms, and so forth (Moretti, 2017). For example, Uzzi (1997) found that
long-term, relational embeddedness are onduive to superior-quality prodution
ompared with arm's-length relationships. He believes the reason for this result lies
in better ommuniation about issues pertaining to quality that the two partners
developed thanks to their well-established relationship in a network.
Eieny. Networks enable members to aess timely a large number of dierent
ators whih are soures of resoures, information, and knowledge through small
number of ties (Burt, 1992). In other words, non-redundant ators whih an redue
the path length among ators in the network aet the eieny of them. This an
improve delivery time and inrease agility and responsiveness to market demand and
unertainty (Um and Kim, 2019). Therefore, eieny improvements are aessible
by better oordinating and streamlining the information, ativities, and proesses
in supply hains (Cao and Zhang, 2011).
Eetiveness. Companies are able to enhane their eetiveness through their
ollaborative networks (Peters et al., 2010). In fat, feedbak from the partners
suh as suppliers enabled the ators like manufaturers to improve the eetiveness
of its manufaturing resoure planning system (Larson, 1991). In other study, Led-
woh et al. (2018) dedued that eetiveness of the supply hain risk management
strategies is moderated by the topology of the supply network and that an inreased
understanding of supply network topology is neessary to underpin the hoie of an
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eetive strategy. They also explain that the inventory mitigation strategy proves
to be eetive for sale-free and random topologies beause it always inreases ll-
rates and might derease osts. However, the amount of ost redution depends on
the network's risk prole and topology.
Innovation ats as an enabler to develop unique produts and servies that pro-
mote ompetitive advantage for ators. Sholars have stressed how ators belonging
to an interorganizational network may improve the learning proess both by ex-
hanging piees of information and by internalizing eah other's knowledge (Podolny
and Page, 1998). Knowledge assets as a driver of innovation oms from internal
knowledge generation and external knowledge soures (Bellamy et al., 2014). In
this regard, external knowledge will be aquired through viarious learning diretly
or indiretly from other ators in the network (Hora and Klassen, 2013). Thus,
align with soial network theorists who emphasize on knowledge and information
assets derived from strutural relationships among as the soures whih enhane
innovation, there is an argument that supply hain networks serve as important
onduits and soures of information and knowledge aess, and at as atalysts
for the development and dissemination of new ideas, appliations, and supply hain
praties (Bellamy et al., 2014). For example, Bellamy et al. (2014) in their researh
examined the strutural harateristis of supply networks and onluded that in-
teronneted supply networks strengthen the assoiation between supply network
aessibility and innovation output. Moreover, the inuene of the two strutural
harateristis inluding aessibility and interonnetedness on innovation output
an be enhaned by a rm's absorptive apaity and level of supply network partner
innovativeness. Another sholar suh as Ahuja (2000) showed that innovation rate is
positively related to the number of relations with other ators where interonneted
themselves.
Sustainability. The Resoure-based view (RBV) theory suggests that a rm an
reate sustainable and ompetitive advantage through the exploitation of resoures
(e.g., ore ompetene, dynami apability, absorptive apaity) from its external
partners in a unique way (Barney, 1991). The ombination of idiosynrati resoures
from the partnering rms an produe unique, valuable, and inimitable resoures,
thus providing ompetitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Cao and Zhang, 2011). Aord-
ing to RBV, a buying rm an strengthen ore values by investing in relation-spei
assets and exploiting resoures, knowledge, and know-how of its key suppliers, all
of whih make it hallenging for its ompetitors to imitate (Cao and Zhang, 2011;
Fawett et al., 2015; Jap, 2001). This view explains that a buying rm's superiority
an be yielded through heterogeneity (Cao and Zhang, 2011; Um and Kim, 2019).
Legitimay and Status advantages are those benets that are more easily on-
neted to the theory of soial apital and to the interpretation of networks as prisms
of the market. The point made by sholars investigating these issues is that being
onneted to peers with spei harateristis (e.g. high status, large available
resoures) may inrease legitimay at both the organizational and the interorgani-
zational levels (Podolny and Page, 1998). Stuart et al. (1999), for example, found
evidene of the fat that aliation with a prominent alliane partner inreases the
market value (initial publi oering) of a biotehnology rm. They were able to dis-
entangle the eets of resoure exhange and transfer of legitimay, demonstrating
that muh of the benet of having prominent aliates stems from the transfer of
188 Sajad Kazemi
status that is an inherent byprodut of inter-organizational assoiations (p. 315).
Another study, by Stuart (2000), found that allianes an at as endorsements,
in partiular when small, young rms are assoiated with high-status peers: third
parties have more ondene in the quality and value of the small rm thanks to
its network of relationships. Even more interesting for is the study by Baum and
Oliver (1991), whih foused on legitimay benets at the whole-network level. The
novelty with respet to other studies on the subjet is the laim that externalities
of links to high-status ators extend to the whole rm's population (Podolny and
Page, 1998; Moretti, 2017).
4. A Systemati Literature Review on the Supply Chain Network
Metris
The main goal of this systemati literature review is to identify, sreen, and
ategorize all artiles that inorporates network analysis in the supply hain and
supply hain network ontexts whih have foused on the behavior and benets of
ators and the network as a whole. To this aim, we followed a proess by Colihia
and Strozzi (2012) and Wetzstein et al., (2019) through three stages to aomplish
this systemati literature review (Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Overview of systemati literature review methodology
4.1. Data Retrieval
To extrat the literature as our sample data, we need to identify a repliable
and transparent (Cook et al., 1997) sholarly database with high-quality studies in
the leading journals. To this aim, we seleted the Sopus sholarly database for its
advantages ompared to other databases like Google Sholar and Web of Siene
(Mongeon and Paul-Has, 2016; Harzing and Alakangas, 2017). Then, to ensure a
transparent and unbiased proess of extrating relevant artiles, we used a keyword
searhing protool
1
. This protool onentrates on Supply hain(s) Supply net-
work(s), and Supply hain network(s) as our main keywords for ontexts and
1
( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "supply hain*" OR "supply network*" OR "supply hain net-
work*" OR "interrm*" ) ) AND ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "network struture" OR "net-
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onsiders network analysis view through inorporating Network struture, Net-
work theory, Network, and Network analysis keywords. In addition, align with
the main aim of this literature review to investigate those harateristis of organi-
zation as unit of analysis whih aet its behavior and outomes through the lens of
network analysis, we added the main keywords whih is related to the potential ad-
vantages of inter-organizational networks inluding Performane, Eetiveness,
Sustainability, Outome, Eieny, and Innovation. In this searhing proto-
ol, we just foused on peer reviewed artiles with exluding all onferene papers,
book hapters, reviews and reports, books, editorials, and notes. This exlusion is
for the purpose of inreasing methodologial standards and onentrating on the
forefront ontributions by experts in the eld (Colihia and Strozzi, 2012; Wet-
zstein et al., 2016). In order to perform our systemati literature review, setting a
time period is essential for data analysis (Wetzstein et al., 2019). The analytial
results in Figure 4 illustrates the orresponding trend of artiles by time with 5062
reords in this realm after the searhing keywords, starting from 1970 to 2020.
Fig. 4. Supply hain and supply hain network douments, inorporating network view by
year (Sopus analytial results)
Figure 2 illustrates that this realm of study in the time span of 1970 and 2020
started to beome a hot topi with a sharp inreasing trend among the sholars
approximately from 1998 with around 20 papers.
However, this time span inludes many irrelevant reords in our sample sele-
tion. So, for better analyzing and integrating the data and exlusively fousing on
the studies with highest t to the sope of this literature review, we needed some
riteria for further sreening (Wetzstein et al., 2019). To this aim and to ensure a
high-quality standard of our literature review, we foused on high-quality artiles
from the leading journals of the topi under study with minimum sore of '3' (based
on Assoiation of Business Shools' (ABS) Aademi Journal Quality Guide rank-
ing within UK business shools) (Walker et al., 2019; Wetzstein et al., 2019) whih
work theory" OR "network analysis" OR "network" ) ) AND ( TITLE-ABS-KEY (
"performane" OR "eetiveness" OR "sustainability" OR "outome" OR "eieny"
OR "innovation" ) ) AND ( LIMIT-TO ( DOCTYPE , "ar" ) )
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are in the elds of General Management, Ethis, Corporate Soial Responsibility,
International Business and Area Studies, Innovation, Operations and Tehnol-
ogyManagement, Operations Researh andManagement Siene, Organizational
Studies, Soial Sienes, and Strategy. This sreening stage, limited the primary
reords to 753 artiles for further analysis. The distribution of these artiles per
eah journal has been presented in Table 3 whih demonstrates the ontribution
of these leading journals in this eld of study. Following Wetzstein et al. (2019)
in the next step of sreening stage, we read the abstrats of these artiles whih
depit an overview of the paper to exlude the artiles that did not meet the main
aim of this literature review. Then, by onsidering the nal seleted papers we read
their ontributions and identied the main network analysis metris in order to
integration.









Administrative siene quarterly 3 Journal of management studies 2
Annals of operations researh 39 Journal of operations management 25
Antipode 1
Journal of produt innovation manage-
ment
6
British journal of management 2 Journal of sheduling 2




Journal of the operational researh soi-
ety
20
Computers and operations researh 29 Journal of world business 1
Computers in industry 11 Long range planning 1
Deision sienes 12 Management siene 11
Eonomi geography 5
Manufaturing and servie operations
management
4
European journal of operational re-
searh
65 Naval researh logistis 5
Harvard business review 1 New politial eonomy 2
Industrial and orporate hange 2 Omega 6
International business review 3 Operations researh 11
International journal of manage-
ment reviews
1 Organization siene 7
International journal of operations
and prodution management
31 Organization studies 1
International journal of prodution
eonomis
140 Prodution and operations management 9
Review on Supply Chain Network Metris 191
International journal of produ-
tion researh
136 Prodution planning and ontrol 48
Journal of business ethis 5 R and d management 4
Journal of business researh 7
Reliability engineering and system
safety
5
Journal of development studies 3
Researh in the soiology of organiza-
tions
1
Journal of eonomi geography 3 Researh poliy 6
Journal of heuristis 1 Strategi management journal 15
Journal of international manage-
ment 2 World development 3
Journal of management 1
∗
Note: No. A: Number of artiles.
Therefore, through this unbiased searh with high quality of results we an
address the nal targeted papers for the analysis and synthesis.
4.2. Analysis and Synthesis
To analyze and synthesize the targeted artiles, we tried to fous on the most
important properties and the related ategories. In traditional studies for investigat-
ing soures of interrm dierenes in ompetition, the fous was simply on strategi
variables like sale, advertising intensity, produt similarity and interdependene
along value hains (e.g., Porter, 1980). However, ators whih have oupied sim-
ilar positions in the interrm networks fae more intensive ompetition, and this
leads to onsider the organizational position within the networks as another ritial
element of ompetition (Gulati et al., 2002).
In this regard, following the study of Wasserman and Faust (1994) as one of
the basi soures for many researhers who investigate researh questions in the
ontext of network using network theory framework, we need to attention that the
attributes of ators (e.g., size, age, produtivity, et.) in the network are seondary
and relational ties are primary. In other words, attributes of ators are understood in
terms of network struture and orresponding patterns of ties among ators. Hene,
researhers an also diretly study these patterns without referring to attributes of
ators in implementing a network viewpoint.
This literature review in investigating soures of interrm dierenes with net-
work analysis illustrates that there are a lot of harateristis whih have been used
to study the behavior and performane of ators and the whole network from two
atomisti and relational viewpoints (Table 4). Aordingly, with a higher empha-
size on relational view, we tried to analyze and synthesize the existent literature
with integrating theoretial ontributions and developed onepts in three levels of
network, node, and tie.
Network-level with onentrating on network struture refers to the overall pat-
tern of relationships within whih all ators are embedded. It is also known as
strutural embeddedness (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Strutural network hara-
teristis apture the impat of the struture of relations around ators on their
tendeny to ooperate with one another and their protability (Gulati et al., 2000).
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Corresponding sholars (e.g., Choi et al., 2001; Choi and Kim, 2008; Borgati and Li,
2009; Kim et al., 2011) in this realm have identied several harateristis whih an
inuene the behavior and performane of ators in the network and the network
as a whole (Table 4).
Tie-level with onentration on relations between ators refers to the set of institu-
tionalized rules and norms that govern appropriate behavior in the network (Gulati
et al., 2000). It is also known as relational embeddedness (Gulati and Gargiulo,
1999). These relations are often inuened by the harateristis of network ties
whih in turn aet the behavior and performane of ators (Granovetter, 1973;
Gulati et al., 2000). Corresponding sholars (e.g., Li and Choi, 2009; Borgati and
Li, 2009; Kim et al., 2011; Carter et al., 2007; Oke et al., 2008) in this realm have
identied several harateristis whih an inuene the behaviors and performane
of ators in the network and the network as a whole (Table 4).
Node-level with onentration on the position of ators in the network struture
refers to the positional harateristis rooted in network models of equivalene and
entrality that apture the roles ators oupy in a network whih aet their
behavior and performane and the network as a whole (Gulati et al., 2000). It is
also known as positional embeddedness (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Corresponding
sholars (e.g., Kim et al., 2011; Li and Choi, 2009; Borgati and Li, 2009; Vereeke
et al., 2006) in this realm have identied several harateristis whih an inuene
the behavior and performane of ators in the network and the network as a whole
(Table 4).
5. Positions and Roles
In network studies there are a broad range of researh whih have paid to study
of positions that are assoiated with the soiologial onept of role and status
(Kinnie et al., 2005). In the soial networks, the fous is on properties of soial
ators for dening the notion of soial role in assoiated with soial position from
the theoretial, oneptual, and formal viewpoints. While, in the network ontexts,
the fous is on assoiations among relations to dene network role as the olletions
of relations and the assoiations among relations that onnet network positions
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Studies like Majumder and Srinivasan (2008) and Dittrih and Duysters (2007)
have investigated the leading behavior of ators in network positions based on the
network harateristis suh as entralization and tie strength, respetively. The
position of an ator in the network an inuene on its behavior and performane
(Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). These advantages whih are resulted from orrespond-
ing network strutural harateristis suh as entrality of ator's position and power
have been aknowledged in several studies (e.g., Gulati et al., 2000; Bellamy et al.,
2014; Sanou et al., 2016). These studies are following network theory suggestion that
the role and status of ators in the network are based on their strutural relations
and is measurable through their positions in the network struture.
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Table 4. Inuential harateristis on ators' behavior and performane within the net-





































Gulati et al., 2000; Provan et




Gulati et al., 2000; Provan et
al., 2005; Zaheer et al., 2010
Bridging
Everett and Valente, 2016;
Gulati et al., 2001
Closure Zaheer et al., 2010





Powell et al., 1996; Swierzek,
2018; Costenbader and
Valente, 2003; Zaheer et al.,
2010; Borgatti and Everett,
2006; Borgatti and Li, 2009
Power
Gulati et al., 2000; Zaheer et
al., 2010
Embeddedness Basole et al., 2018
Brokerage Everett and Valente, 2016
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hilling and
Phelps, 2007; Basole et al.,
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Kim et al., 2011; Adenso-Diaz
et al., 2012
Clustering (or lique)
Chang et al., 2012; Provan et
al., 2005
Strutural hole
Kinnie et al., 2005; Gulati et
al., 2000; Zaheer et al., 2010
Strutural equivalene
Kinnie et al., 2005; Gulati et
al., 2000; Zaheer et al., 2010
Network ohesion Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999
Network size
Hoang and Antoni, 2003;
Swierzek, 2018
Aessibility Bellami et al., 2014
Interonnetedness
(network eieny)


























Kildu and Brass, Bellami
et al., 2014; Wasserman and
Faust, 1994; Segev, 1989;
Gulati et al., 2002
Organizational age




Kildu and Brass, 20;
Wasserman and Faust,
1994; Segev, 1989
Protability Porter, 1980; Segev, 1989
Quality Porter, 1980; Segev, 1989
Produt similarity
Gulati et al., 2000; Porter,
1980; Segev, 1989
Et.
Organizations in the entral positions with a large number of ties have better
information about potential partners in the network whih provide them with ollab-
orative opportunities, hene lowering their level of unertainty about partnerships
(Gulati 1999; Powell et al. 1996). This information advantages are omplemented
by ator's visibility in entral positions, and in unertain environment these two
signaling properties represents the reputation of ators in the network whih an be
extended beyond its diret ties to indiret ties (Podolny 1993; Kinnie et al., 2005).
Therefore, to study ator's role in the network ontext, onsidering it from multi-
ple levels and related harateristis will provide a fruitful theoretial ontribution.
Aordingly, in this researh we will rst fous on the position of ators in the
network struture from the relational viewpoint, and seond, from the assoiations
between relations and the ontent of relations. Pure strutural analysis ause to
treat various types of relations among ators as more or less equivalent as the net-
work struture is pivotal omparing to the ontent of ties (Kildu and Brass, 2010).
Also, various types of relations are often aggregated together to a strutural tie
(Burt, 1992). However, various types of relations among ators leads to various ef-
fets (Podolny and Baron, 1997; Labiana and Brass, 2006). Studies like Dyer and
Singh (1998) and Gulati et al. (2002) argue that strutural and relational hara-
teristis of organizations drive value from the supply hain network for them. The
strutural harateristis fous on the position of organizations in the network and
the onsequent benets suh as resoure advantage, resoure spillovers, information
aessibility et. However, the relational harateristis fous on the ties and the
type of inuene on the partners. Aordingly, the performane of eah organiza-
tion depends on its ability to exploit these interative harateristis in a way that
enhanes its inuene and ontrol over other ators.
Therefore, onsidering the ontent of relationships between ators may leads
to their dierent behavior and performane even with idential network struture
(Kildu and Brass, 2010). Aordingly, to study of any roles in the network ontexts
suh as supply hain network and their inuene on the ator's performane it is
neessary to investigate it through onsidering the network strutural viewpoint and
the ontent of relations. Finally, some atomisti properties ould help us as ontrol
variables to reah more valid results in order to ompare ators and orresponding
roles in the inter-organizational relationships. Among these three properties for
investigation of roles, we have identied inuential network strutural properties and
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atomisti properties. However, the ontent of relationships has been not explained
yet whih alls for more lariation.
The ontent of relationships orresponding to the roles whih ators play is
inherently based on the behavior of ators toward eah other and the nature of
relationships in the ontext. In other words, the ontent of relationships in a spei
ontext is omprised of the behavior that may indiate role of ators (Cloyd, 1964;
Nooteboom and Stam, 2008, p.307; Gleave et al., 2009; Prior and Maros-Cuevas,
2016).
5.1. Network Centrality
In this setion we want to fous on the key node-level soial network analysis
metris and in partiular entrality to disuss how this metri an be used to inter-
pret dierent roles in supply hain networks. Centrality is one of the most studied
onepts in soial network analysis (Borgatti, 2005). Network entrality refers to
the extent to whih an ator oupies a position in the network whih is relatively
known as the most important, prominent, and strategi position. The importane,
prominene, and strategi terms are pereived dierently in the literature whih
led to various measures of entrality (Borgatti and Everett, 2006; Kiss and Bihler,
2008; Vurro et al., 2009; Zaheer et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011; Sanou et al., 2016).
For example, the more the entrality, the more status (Bonaih, 1972), the more
power (Ibarra, 1993), the more prestige (Burt, 1982), the more aessibility (Bellami
et al., 2014), et. (Table 5).
The onept of network entrality addresses the position of a ators in relation to
other ators in a network (see Bloh et al., 2017; Borgatti and Li, 2009; Wasserman
and Faust, 1994). The position of an ator in the network an inuene on its
behavior and performane (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). These advantages whih are
resulted from orresponding network strutural harateristis suh as entrality
of ator's position have been aknowledged in several studies (e.g., Gulati et al.,
2000; Bellamy et al., 2014; Sanou et al., 2016; Ibarra, 1993). These studies are
following network theory suggestion that the role of ators in the network are based
on their strutural relations and is measurable through their positions in the network
struture. Sholars believe that a entral position of ators illustrates their apability
to loate, aess and disperse valuable information and resoures, thereby enhaning
performane (Borgatti, 2005; Tsai, 2001).
For example, Ibarra (1993) indiates that network entrality with onsidering
interations among ators in a network struture has an important eet on roles
and in partiular innovation role where entrality addresses the strutural soure
of power and determines the degrees of aess to and ontrol over valued resoures.
Organizations in the entral positions with a large number of ties have better in-
formation about potential partners in the network whih provide them with ollab-
orative opportunities, hene lowering their level of unertainty about partnerships
(Gulati, 1999; Powell et al., 1996). This information advantages are omplemented
by ator's visibility in entral positions, and in unertain environment these two
signaling properties represents the reputation of ators in the network whih an be
extended beyond its diret ties to indiret ties (Podolny, 1993; Kinnie et al., 2005).
Table 5 illustrates an overview of key entrality metris and orresponding impli-
ations for network roles in the ontext of modeling supply networks. Understanding
the situations and the purpose of the study in the supply hain network an on-
tribute to the seletion of the best alternative in our analysis.
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Table 5. Main entrality measures and relevant appliations (Freeman, 1979; Ballester et






When an ator is onneted to a highest number of nodes.
It refers to the extent to whih an organization has an
impat on operational deisions or strategi behavior of





The degree of diulty faed by an organization in man-
aging inoming material ows from the upstream ators




The degree of diulty faed by an organization in dealing





When an ator an quikly reah all the other ators, di-
retly and indiretly. It refers to the extent to whih an or-
ganization has freedom from the ontrolling ations of oth-






When an ator onnets other ators with highest apa-
ity to ontrol interations among them. It refers to the
extent to whih an organization an intervene or has on-
trol over interations among other ators in the supply
hain network.
Betweenness entrality also refers to the extent to whih
an organization aet the nal assembler's operational
performane in terms of produt quality, oordination







It ounts the number of paths that stem from an ator
exponentially disounted based on the length of paths.
Prestige
Interentrality
It ounts the total number of suh paths that hit the a-
tor; it is the sum of the ator's Katz-Bonaih entrality






Sum of entrality of neighbors. Prestige
Diusion
entrality
The expeted number of times that ators have been on-
tated is omputed using the number of walks.
Diusion
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Game-theoreti entrality measure. Soial network analysis methods are ap-
plied in many other elds suh as eonomis, physis, information tehnologies, et.
(Avrahenkov et al., 2015). Supply hain network is one of the areas whih soial
network analysis an be applied to study the roles and positions of ators or orga-
nizations in relation with eah other (Kim et al., 2011). Supply hain networks an
be visualized based on the soial exhanges among ators and using graphs. Graph
theory provides main analysis tools for networks (Mart

inez-Lopez et al., 2009). In
partiular, by alulating entrality measures for ators or nodes one may detet
ative ators (organization) of a supply hain network.
Community detetion refers to the proedure of identifying groups of interat-
ing nodes (i.e., ators) in a network depending upon their strutural properties. It
has been used to unveil the strutural properties and behaviors of networks as well
as ators in the network (Javed et al., 2018). Avrahenkov et al. (2018) indiates
the importane of using game theory, and in partiular, oalition game theory for
ommunity detetion problem. They introdued ooperative game theory approah
to explain possible mehanisms behind luster formation. This approah is based
on the Myerson value in ooperative game theory, whih partiularly emphasizes
the value alloation in the ontext of games with interations between players on-
strained by a network. In this researh we an implement their method in a supply
hain network ontext where ators ooperate with eah other to fulll ustomer's
needs.
Myerson ooperative game approah (Avrahenkov et al., 2018). In general, a
ooperative game of n ators is a pair < N, v > where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of
ators and v : 2N → R is a map presribing for a oalition S ∈ 2N some value v(S)
suh that v (∅) = 0. This funtion v(S) is the total utility that members of S an
jointly attain. Suh a funtion is alled the harateristi funtion of ooperative
game.
We rst need to onstrut the harateristi funtion. Eah link in the supply
hain network ontext among ators gives to oalition S the value of r, where
0 < r < 1. Moreover, ators an gain a value from indiret links whih an be
interpreted based on the length of the simple path k. Therefore, for any oalition




ak (g, S) .r
k
(1)
where ak (g, S) is the number of simple paths of length k in the oalition (S). Then
the Myerson value of an ator i is given by:











k (g, S) is the number of simple paths of length k ontaining node i in the
oalition S dened with graph g. The denominator (k + 1) is based on the length
of the simple paths whih are bounded by n− 1.
Let we onsider a supply hain network onsist of two suppliers (S), one manu-
faturer (M), one distributer (D), and two retailers (R) where they have symmetri
ollaborative links (Figure 5). In this network we have N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} ators. In
this ooperative game we nd the Myerson value Yi (v, g) for eah ator.
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Fig. 5. The struture of supply hain network
Aording to the Figure 5 we an identify possible paths whih ontains eah
spei ator (Table 6).
Table 6. The possible paths whih ontain the ator i
ator
i
Length 1 Length 2 Length 3
S1 {S1, M1} {S1, M1, S2}, {S1, M1, D1} {S1, M1, D1, R1}, {S1, M1, D1, R2}





{M1, D1, R1}, {M1, D1, R2},
{D1, M1, S2}, {D1, M1, S1},
{S1, M1, S2}
{S2, M1, D1, R2}, {S1, M1, D1, R2},





{D1, M1, S1}, {D1, M1, S2},
{M1, D1, R2}, {M1, D1, R1},
{R1, D1, R2}
{S2, M1, D1, R2}, {S1, M1, D1, R2},
{S1, M1, D1, R1}, {S2, D1, D1, R1}
R1 {R1, D1} {R1, D1, R2}, {R1, D1, M1} {R1, D1, M1, S1}, {R1, D1, M1, S2}
R2 {R2, D1} {R2, D1, R1}, {R1, D1, M1} {R2, D1, M1, S1}, {R2, D1, M1, S2}
Then with alulation of Myerson value for eah ator (Table 7) using r = 0.5
we an rank ative ators whih an be interpreted as oordinator, integrator, or
leader in the supply hain network ontext.
Table 7. Myerson value for eah ator i







The results illustrate that manufaturer and distributer have the highest Myer-
son value in the supply hain network ontext.
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6. Conlusion and Future Researh
In the supply hain network, eah ator is engaged in a set of exhange inter-
organizational relationships whih denes the network struture. To have a fruitful
theoretial ontribution orresponding to the ators' role and their positions with
related harateristis and outomes it is neessary to take a multilevel analysis
perspetive. First, a behavioral expetation related to a given position in network
struture highlights the importane of relational attributes in terms of node level,
tie level and network level harateristis of organizations. Seond, the emergent
view of role highlights the ontent of relationships orresponding to the roles whih
ators play and it is inherently based on the style of behavior toward eah other and
the nature of relationships among organizations. It also emphasizes on the atomisti
properties of ators in the network whih aet their role toward other ators.
Therefore, for future study we propose to investigate any role suh as leader and
follower roles among supply hain network members using this framework through
a multilevel analysis approah onsidering the relational and emergent aspets of
role.
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